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20130203
20130203
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. it is for these reasons that i believe he is the wrong person to lead the pentagon at this perilous and consequential time. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator inhofe. we have two former chairmen of this committee with us to introduce senator hagel. no senator has had two dearer friends or better mentor is that -- mentors than i have had with senators nunn and warner. i want to welcome them back to this committee. i don't have to tell them that they are among dear, dear friends. it is a real treat to welcome you back to the committee. i will call on you, senator nunn, first. i will call you alphabetically. i have no better way to do it. sam? [laughter] sam, welcome back. >> first, for the record, seniority and age are two different things. senator levin, ranking member inhofe, i am honored to join my friend john warner in presenting chuck hagel to the committee and recommending that chuck be confirmed as our secretary of defense. i think it is worth noting that 68 years ago this month, john warner and listed in the u.s. -- enlisted in the u.s. navy to fight in world war ii. that was
reasons, the pentagon have made their own case to the president. with the new resource problem home -- problem in mali. look what it took to support french forces against al qaeda subcontractors. if we can't do that, when americans are held hostage and killed, what kind of response do you really expect for -- >> is that a consequence of the u.s. not getting involved in mali earlier? >> what is the implication from that? that we need to be involved -- >> we were concerned about molly for at least eight months. only now there is discussion about what we should -- >> have another discussion on benghazi for the thousandth time. >> we are in the in danger -- in no danger of intervening too much. that is not what we have to worry about. >> let's move on. if you have a question, raise your hands and identify yourself. keep your questions short. let's go to -- then this woman right here in the black. >> as joshua said, syria is part of a broader middle east. what would be the position of the u.s. when lebanon, jordan, maybe israel and the whole region would be unstable? should the u.s. the
with the pentagon, first with bob gates and mike mullah, then with leon panetta and marty dempsey. by the same token, america's traditional allies and friends in europe and east asia remain invaluable partners on nearly everything we do and we have spent considerable energy strengthening those bonds over the past four years and i would be quick to add, the u.n., the i.m.f., the world bank and nato, are also still essential. but all of our institutions and our relationships need to be modernized and complemented by new institutions, relationships and partnerships, that are tailored for new challenges and modeled to the needle -- needle of a variable landscape, like how we elevated the g20 during the financial crisis or created the climate and clean air coalition out of the state department to fight short lived pollutants like black carbon, or worked with partners like turkey where the two of us stood up the first global counterterrorism forum. we're also working more than ever with invigorated regional organizations. consider the african union and somalia and the arab league in libya, even subregiona
in new york. the pentagon is broken. what do we know about al qaeda? did we know that members of this network, all this information we take for granted now? >> we did not know that much. we did not know who was responsible for 9/11. we had a few assets that provided us some peripheral information. we did not know very much. it took a long time for us to be in a position to really learn what was going on. in march of 2002, we captured al zabeta. we recognized that we had to do something different. contrary to what some people are saying, he initially provided a couple of pieces of information. then he shut down. we knew they were coming after us in the second wave of attacks. we knew that they had a nuclear program. they had a biological weapons program. we thought we needed to do something different. that is when the enhanced interrogation program came into existence. he went through the program, started in august of 2002 for 20 days or so. a few weeks later we captured a major player. he was a go-between. this was the key to all of that. we forget that it was not just osama b
of the pentagon. it was clearly unsettled. it looked much worse than we had thought. the first hope was that if we got saddam hussein, that would solve the problem. we made an effort to do that. in december, we picked up saddam. it became obvious that, as one of my guys described, a bunch of former regime guys were not really running the beginning of the resistance, the beginning of the insurgency. zarqawi had started to build a network that took trained people, or iraqi sunnis -- trained people, iraqi sunnis, who had been dislocated from their position in society, sometimes government, sometimes military might and they were terrified of the shia, which was going to be dominant in the future. you had this combination of factors that was fear of the future, frustration against foreign invaders, and then -- not as much religious extremism as sometimes is perceived. it was not really an al qaeda religious movement. it was a political movement, but he got leveraged by some very clever work by people like abu musab al-zarqawi. we were very sure he was there at the beginning of early 2004. we started to
Search Results 0 to 5 of about 6 (some duplicates have been removed)

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